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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Petitioner Xu Yong Lu seeks to reopen immigration 
proceedings on account of alleged ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Lu filed a motion to reopen before an Immigration 
Judge, which was denied. The Board of Immigration 
Appeals affirmed, in part because Lu failed to comply with 
the procedural requirements laid out in Matter of Lozada, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). We conclude that the 
Lozada requirements are a reasonable exercise of the 
Board's discretion; furthermore, the Board did not err in 
holding that Lu failed to satisfy these requirements. 
Therefore, we will affirm the denial of Lu's motion to reopen 
his immigration proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
Xu Yong Lu is a native and citizen of the People's 
Republic of China ("PRC"). In the summer of 1993, he 
arrived at the shores of Rockaway Beach, New York, aboard 
the Golden Venture, a vessel carrying approximately 150 
other aliens. Lu claims that he fled the PRC in order to 
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escape persecution under the country's "one couple -- one 
child" policy. Because Lu has three children, he was 
subject to a number of fines, threatened with incarceration, 
and his wife was sterilized. 
 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United 
States detained Lu shortly after his arrival at Rockaway 
Beach. The INS instituted exclusion proceedings and Lu 
requested an attorney. At a hearing conducted on July 2, 
1993, Lu's appointed counsel, Michael Usher, admitted the 
charges against Lu but contended that the INS should seek 
deportation rather than exclusion. Lu then filed two 
applications for political asylum or, in the alternative, 
withholding of deportation. 
 
Immigration Judge Wayne R. Iskra conducted a formal 
hearing on the merits of Lu's claim on September 1, 1993. 
In an oral decision, Judge Iskra cited two advisory opinions 
by the State Department, which both recommended 
denying political asylum. He also found that Lu's testimony 
contained numerous contradictions and lacked credibility 
-- it was "essentially incomplete and he was hesitant." 
Finally, he noted that a claim for asylum based solely upon 
China's one-child policy is foreclosed by Board precedent. 
He therefore denied all claims and ordered Lu excluded and 
deported. Mr. Usher expressly reserved the right to appeal, 
and Judge Iskra indicated that an appeal, if desired, had to 
be filed on or before September 13, 1993. No appeal was 
filed. Lu contends that his attorney agreed to pursue an 
appeal; however, he concedes that he had no further 
contact with Mr. Usher after the hearing. 
 
Almost one year later, Lu filed a pro se habeas corpus 
petition in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania. The court issued a stay of Lu's 
deportation and eventually consolidated his petition with 
those of other Golden Venture detainees. However, on 
September 5, 1995, the government moved to dismiss the 
petition because of Lu's failure to timely appeal his original 
deportation order. In response, Lu requested that the court 
hold the government's motion in abeyance while he filed a 
motion to reopen the administrative proceeding, which 
would allow him to file an untimely appeal to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. The District Court dismissed Lu's 
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habeas corpus petition, but nonetheless continued to stay 
his deportation pending the outcome of his motion to 
reopen. Lu filed his motion to reopen on September 25, 
1996. In it, he argued that Mr. Usher's failure to appeal 
Judge Iskra's decision constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
 
On December 31, 1996, Judge Iskra denied Lu's motion 
to reopen the administrative proceedings. First, he rejected 
Lu's contention that Mr. Usher was obligated to file an 
appeal because he had expressly reserved the right to do 
so. Judge Iskra stated that "it is not clear whether former 
counsel owed his client a duty to appeal the case." Even if 
such a claim had merit, however, Judge Iskra found that 
Lu had not complied with the procedural requirements of 
Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). 
Specifically, Lu did not establish the existence of an 
agreement with Mr. Usher to file an appeal, and he failed to 
adequately explain his decision not to pursue a disciplinary 
complaint with the bar association. As a result, Lu's claims 
did not establish the exceptional circumstances necessary 
to reopen immigration proceedings. 
 
Lu filed a timely appeal with the BIA shortly thereafter. 
He claimed that Judge Iskra's decision violated his 
fundamental due process rights. The BIA rejected Lu's 
arguments "for the reasons set forth in the Immigration 
Judge's . . . written decision." Lu then filed a second 
habeas corpus petition in federal court seeking review of the 
BIA's decision. The District Court transferred the petition to 
us. Our task, therefore, is to review the denial of Lu's 
motion to reopen his immigration proceedings. 
 
II. 
 
At the time Lu filed his motion, there was no statutory 
provision governing the reopening of immigration 
proceedings.1 See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The only existing authority was a regulation promulgated by the 
Attorney General, which described when such a motion should be 
denied, rather than granted. See 8 C.F.R. S 3.23(b)(3) (1996); see also 
Doherty, 502 U.S. at 322-23. Since the filing of Lu's motion, Congress 
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112 S.Ct. 719, 724 (1992) ("There is no statutory provision 
for reopening of a deportation proceeding."). Instead, "the 
authority [to reopen derived] solely from regulations 
promulgated by the Attorney General. . . . [who had] `broad 
discretion' to grant or deny such motions." Id.; see also INS 
v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143-45 & n.5, 101 S.Ct. 
1027, 1030-32 & n.5 (1981). 
 
We have traditionally disfavored motions to reopen 
immigration proceedings for the same reason we disfavor 
"petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence." Id. at 323; Katsis v. 
INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1070 (3d Cir. 1993). If anything, 
deportation proceedings are even more disfavored because 
"as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of 
the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the 
United States." Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323, 112 S.Ct. at 724- 
25; see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 108, 108 S.Ct. 904, 
913 (1988) ("Granting such motions too freely will permit 
endless delay of deportation by aliens creative and fertile 
enough to continuously produce new and material facts 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case."). 
 
Thus, we review the BIA's decision to deny reopening for 
abuse of discretion, mindful of the "broad" deference that 
the Supreme Court would have us afford. See Abudu, 485 
U.S. at 110, 108 S.Ct. at 915 ("[T]he reasons for giving 
deference to agency decisions on petitions for reopening or 
reconsideration in other administrative contexts apply with 
even greater force in the INS context."); Doherty, 502 U.S. 
at 323, 112 S.Ct. at 724-25 ("[T]he abuse-of-discretion 
standard applies to motions to reopen `regardless of the 
underlying basis of the alien's request [for relief].' "). 
 
III. 
 
Lu argues that the BIA should have reopened his case 
because he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
has enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 ("IIRIRA"). The IIRIRA 
provides a mechanism for reopening immigration proceedings, see 8 
U.S.C. S 1229a(c)(6), but it only applies to motions filed on or after 
April 
1, 1997. See 8 U.S.C. S 1229a. Lu filed his motion to reopen on 
September 24, 1996. 
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Immigration proceedings, however, are civil, rather than 
criminal, in nature; therefore, the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of effective counsel does not attach. See INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 
3483 (1984); Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1520 n.4 
(3d Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, petitioners in deportation 
proceedings enjoy Fifth Amendment Due Process 
protections. In Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10, 13-14 (1st Cir. 
1988), the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
ineffective assistance of counsel could constitute a denial of 
due process if "the alien was prevented from reasonably 
presenting his case." See also Hernandez v. Reno, 238 F.3d 
50, 55 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[W]here counsel does appear for the 
respondent, incompetence in some situations may make the 
proceeding fundamentally unfair and give rise to a Fifth 
Amendment due process objection."); Castaneda-Suarez v. 
INS, 993 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[C]ounsel at a 
deportation hearing may be so ineffective as to have 
impinged upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing in 
violation of the fifth amendment due process clause."); 
Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 499-500 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
 
The government argues, however, that aliens facing 
exclusion proceedings do not enjoy the same set of rights as 
those facing deportation. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 
21, 32, 103 S.Ct. 321, 329 (1982) ("This Court has long 
held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United 
States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights 
regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude 
aliens is a sovereign prerogative."). Although we recognize 
that Plasencia is still good law, see, e.g., Zadvydas v. 
Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Denial of 
entry is . . . not a deprivation of rights subject to 
procedural due process, . . . we leave it to Congress to 
determine the procedures to be used in adjudicating such 
claims."), we are reluctant to hold that aliens facing 
exclusion have no recourse against deficient counsel. Such 
a ruling would simply encourage abuse. Because aliens 
often do not speak English and are usually unfamiliar with 
our laws and procedures, they are particularly vulnerable 
to inadequate counsel. In fact, Congress has long 
recognized the importance of counsel in immigration 
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proceedings, allowing aliens "the privilege of being 
represented (at no expense to the Government) by such 
counsel . . . as he shall choose" in any exclusion or 
deportation proceeding. See 8 U.S.C. S 1362 (2000); see 
also Chlomos v. INS, 516 F.2d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 1975). 
Accordingly, we hold that a claim of ineffective assistance, 
if properly established, could constitute proper grounds for 
reopening an exclusion proceeding. Hence, we must now 
decide whether the facts of this case warrant a reopening. 
 
IV. 
 
The BIA rejected Lu's claims because he did not comply 
with the procedural requirements set forth in Matter of 
Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). This is the first 
opportunity we have had to review the Board's three-prong 
test for analyzing ineffective assistance claims. 2 We 
conclude that it is a reasonable exercise of the Board's 
discretion. 
 
In Lozada, the respondent filed a Notice of Appeal (Form 
I-290A), but failed to submit a written brief or statement in 
support of his position. After over a year of inactivity, the 
BIA dismissed the appeal. Almost two years later, however, 
the respondent filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, 
claiming that his counsel's failure to submit supporting 
materials constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
Board rejected the respondent's claim and laid out a three- 
step procedure for establishing "egregious" ineffective 
assistance that would justify reopening: 
 
       A motion based upon a claim of ineffective assistance 
       of counsel should be supported by an affidavit of the 
       allegedly aggrieved respondent attesting to the relevant 
       facts. . . . [T]hat affidavit should include a statement 
       that sets forth in detail the agreement that was entered 
       into with former counsel with respect to the actions to 
       be taken on appeal and what counsel did or did not 
       represent to the respondent in this regard. 
       Furthermore, before allegations of ineffective assistance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We made a passing reference to Lozada in Green v. INS, 46 F.3d 313, 
320 (3d Cir. 1995), but never addressed its merits. 
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       of former counsel are presented to the Board, former 
       counsel must be informed of the allegations and 
       allowed the opportunity to respond. Any subsequent 
       response from counsel, or report of counsel's failure or 
       refusal to respond, should be submitted with the 
       motion. Finally, if it is asserted that prior counsel's 
       handling of the case involved a violation of ethical or 
       legal responsibilities, the motion should reflect whether 
       a complaint has been filed with appropriate 
       disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, 
       and if not, why not. 
 
Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638. The Board adopted such a 
"high standard" in order to assess the "substantial number" 
of ineffective assistance claims that it receives. See id. 
 
The BIA later elaborated on the third prong of the Lozada 
test, the so called "bar complaint" requirement, in In re 
Rivera, 21 I. & N. Dec. 599 (BIA 1996). The Board noted 
that federal disciplinary regulations, which govern attorneys 
practicing before Immigration Judges and the BIA, are not 
meant to be comprehensive. Instead, the Board relies"on 
the disciplinary process of the relevant jurisdiction's bar as 
the first, and ordinarily the fastest, means of identifying 
and correcting possible misconduct." Id. Lozada's bar 
complaint requirement "not only serves to deter meritless 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel but also 
highlights the standards which should be expected of 
attorneys who represent aliens in immigration proceedings." 
Id. In addition, the Board recognized that although it might 
often be possible to resolve the factual questions 
surrounding the quality of an attorney's representation 
without a bar complaint, such a requirement serves 
numerous important purposes: "it increases our confidence 
in the validity of the particular claim, . . . it reduces the 
likelihood that an evidentiary hearing will be needed, . . . it 
serves our long-term interests in policing the immigration 
bar, [and it] protects against possible collusion between 
counsel and the alien client." Id. Finally, the Board 
concluded that a bar complaint requirement was not a 
great "inconvenience" when viewed in light of an alien's 
request to reopen costly and time-consuming administrative 
proceedings. Id. 
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A number of Circuits have held that the Lozada  
requirements are not a per se abuse of the BIA's discretion. 
See, e.g., Hernandez, 238 F.3d at 55; Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 
1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he Board has laid out a 
comprehensive procedure that a petitioner should follow 
. . . and our sister circuits have adopted its reasoning."); 
Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d 487, 495-99 (5th Cir. 2000); 
Esposito v. INS, 987 F.2d 108, 110 (2d Cir. 1993). None has 
explicitly rejected Lozada.3 See, e.g., Huicochea-Gomez v. 
INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001); Henry v. INS, 8 
F.3d 426, 440 (7th Cir. 1993). We generally agree that the 
BIA's three-prong test is not an abuse of the Board's wide- 
ranging discretion. 
 
There are inherent dangers, however, in applying a strict, 
formulaic interpretation of Lozada. In particular, we are 
concerned that courts could apply Lozada's third prong so 
strictly that it would effectively require all petitioners 
claiming ineffective assistance to file a bar complaint. 
Lozada explicitly allows petitioners to provide a reasonable 
explanation for not filing a complaint. In spite of this 
apparent flexibility, courts generally have rejected 
petitioners' explanations. For example, in In re Rivera, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 599, the BIA refused to accept the petitioner's 
decision not to file a complaint because the ineffective 
assistance was likely the result of "a postal error or an 
error of inadvertence." The Board found this explanation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Lu contends that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly 
rejected the bar complaint requirement of Lozada . He relies solely upon 
Figeroa v. United States INS, 886 F.2d 76, 79 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[W]hile 
petitioner took no `action' against [his attorney], we fail to see how 
this 
indicates that [his attorney's] representation was effective."). We note, 
however, that in In re Rivera, 21 I. & N. Dec. 599, the BIA stated that 
"[i]t is not clear whether the Fourth Circuit fully understood the basis 
for 
our Lozada requirements, as Lozada itself is not mentioned in Figeroa." 
The Board then went on to defend and apply the bar complaint 
requirement. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the BIA and held that its analysis of the "ineffective assistance of 
counsel 
claim was appropriate and necessary." Rivera v. INS, 122 F.3d 1062 (4th 
Cir. 1997); see also Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 587, 596 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(dismissing petitioner's ineffective assistance claim in part because she 
failed "to assert her claim . . . to the BIA in the manner prescribed by 
Matter of Lozada"). 
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"inadequate" and suggested that the petitioner had 
improperly minimized the attorney's misconduct. In fact, in 
most cases where petitioners failed to file a bar complaint, 
courts have rejected motions for reopening. See, e.g., 
Shukla v. INS, 2001 WL 176799 at *1-2 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 
2001) (unpublished decision); Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 237 
F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001); Lara, 216 F.3d at 498-99; 
Soniregun v. INS, 165 F.3d 19 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished 
decision); Minasian v. INS, 117 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(unpublished decision); Pimentel v. INS, 8 F.3d 809 (1st Cir. 
1993) (unpublished decision); Miranda v. INS, 946 F.2d 
1565 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (unpublished decision). 
 
However, only in rare circumstances have courts refused 
to reopen immigration proceedings solely because a 
petitioner failed to file a bar complaint. Instead, a number 
of courts have adopted a broader interpretation of Lozada. 
See, e.g., Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 
2000) ("While the requirements of Lozada are generally 
reasonable, they need not be rigidly enforced where their 
purpose is fully served by other means."); Lopez v. INS, 184 
F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (excusing the lack of a bar 
complaint against "a notary posing as an attorney"); 
Esposito, 987 F.2d at 111 (excusing bar complaint 
requirement where petitioner mistakenly believed that 
attorney had already been suspended from the practice of 
law). We generally agree with their approach. In many, if 
not most, cases, petitioners alleging ineffective assistance 
should file disciplinary complaints. However, this is not an 
absolute requirement, and we stress that the failure to file 
a complaint is not fatal if a petitioner provides a reasonable 
explanation for his or her decision.4 
 
V. 
 
Judge Iskra rejected Lu's motion for reopening because 
Lu had failed to satisfy Lozada's first and third procedural 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because of the often unique and highly variable factual circumstances 
surrounding immigration matters, we are reluctant to define what would 
constitute a "reasonable explanation" for not filing a complaint. However, 
it is important that the Board, before denying a motion for reopening, 
details its reasons for rejecting a petitioner's explanation. 
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requirements. First, he had not "set forth in detail" an 
attorney-client agreement: 
 
       [Lu] did not file documentation to support the claim of 
       ineffective assistance of counsel, nor did he discuss in 
       sufficient detail any effective acts by previous counsel 
       to warrant a motion to reopen. Without evidence of the 
       agreement between the Applicant and the former 
       attorney, the Court cannot find there was ineffective 
       assistance of counsel. 
 
Judge Iskra was especially persuaded by the admitted lack 
of communication between Lu and his attorney following 
the formal hearing. In fact, Lu "began to act on his own 
behalf . . . . This leads the Court to believe that there was 
no agreement." Second, Judge Iskra noted that Lu had not 
filed a disciplinary bar complaint against his attorney. Lu 
declined to do so because his former counsel had acted on 
a pro bono basis. Judge Iskra found this explanation to be 
insufficient. The BIA affirmed these findings "for the 
reasons set forth in the Immigration Judge's December 31, 
1996, written decision." 
 
We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 
adopting Judge Iskra's findings. First, there is nothing in 
the record to suggest that Mr. Usher agreed to file an 
appeal after the sentencing hearing. Instead, Lu implies 
that Mr. Usher obligated himself when he expressly 
reserved the right to appeal. We disagree. Although Mr. 
Usher reserved Lu's rights, there is no evidence that he 
agreed to continue his representation. In response, Lu 
suggests that the absence of evidence merely reflects his 
"total lack of ability to communicate directly to Mr. Usher 
because of the language barrier, his lack of formal 
education and his total ignorance of the American justice 
system." We sympathize with Lu's position, but these 
obstacles are not unique. Quite the contrary -- they are 
common attributes shared by many individuals engaged in 
immigration proceedings. If we were to accept Lu's 
arguments, we would seriously undermine the BIA's ability 
to assess the "substantial number" of claims it receives, 
and thus frustrate the stated goal of Lozada. 
 
The Board was also within its discretion to reject Lu's 
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explanation for not filing a bar complaint. An attorney's 
obligation to his client is not diminished by the pro bono 
nature of his representation; hence, we cannot sanction 
Lu's failure to lodge a complaint simply because Mr. Usher 
was not paid. The purpose of the third prong of the Lozada 
test, as well articulated by the BIA in In re Rivera, 21 I. & 
N. Dec. 599 (BIA 1996), is to reinforce "the standards which 
should be expected of attorneys who represent aliens in 
immigration proceedings." Complaints of ineffectiveness 
also give bar associations an opportunity to conduct a legal 
"post mortem" of an action to determine if one of its 
members performed below the horizon of professional 
competence. We believe that accepting Lu's explanation 
would effectively lower the bar for attorneys representing 
clients pro bono. Because all clients deserve the same level 
of basic competency from their attorneys, we are unwilling 
to endorse a lower standard for pro bono representation. 
Thus, although a bar complaint is not always required 
under Lozada, the BIA's decision to reject Lu's explanation 
was not an abuse of discretion. As a result, we will affirm 
the BIA's denial of Lu's motion to reopen his immigration 
proceedings.5 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the denial of 
Lu's motion to reopen. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Because we agree that Lu did not satisfy the procedural requirements 
of Lozada, we need not address whether Lu suffered prejudice as a result 
of Mr. Usher's performance or the Board's alternative conclusion that "a 
claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel as the reason for 
untimeliness [is not] a proper ground for reopening proceedings." 
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